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MY LORD,—The business of factious demagogues of
all parties is to find fault with everything, to propose nothing practical, to
oppose whatever is suggested, to misrepresent and to defame. The object of
honest and rational politicians ought to be to understand each other—to deal
frankly, abhorring concealment, that mistakes may not be made about facts, terms
or intentions ; to deal fairly, giving credit for a desire to elicit truth and a
wish to weigh in a just balance both sides of every question. Having put before
you such evidence as I hope will lead your Lordship's mind to the conclusion
that the system by which the North American colonies are at present governed
must be abandoned, it is not improbable that your Lordship may inquire what it
is that we are desirous to substitute for that system ? The demand is a
reason-able one. The party who seek this change are bound to prove that they
have a safe and intelligible remedy for the evils of which they complain. If I
cannot show to your Lordship that, without endangering the authority of the
mother country over her Provinces, weakening the constitutional powers of the
Crown or trenching on the high privileges and wide range
of duty assigned to the
Imperial Parliament, a better form of government than that which I am anxious to
overturn—one more nearly conforming to the practice and spirit of the
Constitution, as understood at home—to the wants and peculiar situation of
these colonies, and less repugnant to the feelings and prejudices of English-men
everywhere—can be established, then I must quit the field of argument and
cannot complain if your Lordship adheres to your own opinions.
THE
QUEEN AND PARLIAMENT
From what has been already written, it will be seen that I
leave to the Sovereign and to
the Imperial Parliament the uncontrolled authority over the military and naval
force distributed over the colonies ; that I carefully abstain from trenching
upon their right to bind the whole empire by treaties and other diplomatic
arrangements with foreign states ; or to regulate the trade of the colonies with
the mother country and with each other. I yield to them also the same right of
interference which they now exercise over colonies and over English incorporated
towns; whenever a desperate case of factious usage of the powers confided, or
some reason of state, affecting the preservation of peace and order, call for
that interference. As the necessity of the case, the degree and nature of this
interference, would always be fully discussed by all parties concerned, I am not
afraid of these great powers being often abused, particularly as the temptations
to use them would be much lessened if the internal administration were
improved.
THE
COLONIAL OFFICE
The Colonial Secretary's duties should be narrowed to a watchful super-vision
over each colony to see that the authority of the Crown was not impaired and
that Acts of Parliament and public treaties were honestly and firmly carried out
; but he should have no right to appoint more than two or three officers in each
Province and none to intermeddle in any internal affair, so long as the Colonial
Government was conducted without conflict with the Imperial Government and did
not exceed the scope of its authority. This would give him enough to do, without
heaping upon him duties so burden-some and various that they cannot be
discharged with honour by any man, however able ; nor with justice or safety to
the millions whose interests they affect. His responsibility should be limited
to the extent of his powers ; and as these would be familiar to every
Englishman, exposure and punishment would not be difficult, in case of
ignorance, incapacity or neglect.
THE
GOVERNOR
I have shown in the illustration drawn from the city of Liverpool, that most
governors come out to colonies so ignorant of their geography and topography
climate, productions, commerce, resources and wants, and above all, of the
parties,
passions and prejudices which divide them, and of the character, talents and
claims of the men by whom the population are influenced and led, that for the
first six or twelve months they are like overgrown boys at school. It is equally
clear, that while the business of government must move on and the administration
commence from the day on which the new Governor arrives, the schoolmasters, from
whom all his facts are derived—from whom he gathers his views of internal
affairs and his impressions, not only of different parties, but of individuals
of each party,—are the irresponsible Executive Councillors, whom the present
system calls around him, and who, possessed of such advantages, rarely fail,
before he can by any possibility escape from their toils, to embroil him with
the popular branch of the Legislature and the mass of the people by whom it is sustained.
Now let us suppose, that when a Governor arrives in Nova Scotia, he finds
himself surrounded, not by this irresponsible Council, who represent nothing
except the whims of his predecessors and the interests of a few families (so
small in point of numbers, that but for the influence which office and the distribution
of patronage give them, their relative weight in the country would be
ridiculously diminutive),—but by men who say to him : " May it please
your Excellency, there was a general election in this Province last month or
last year, or the year before last, and an administration was formed upon the
results of that election. We, who compose the Council, have ever since been
steadily sustained by a majority of the Commons and have reason to believe that
our conduct and policy have been satisfactory to the country at large." A
Governor thus addressed would feel that at all events he was surrounded by those
who represented a majority of the population, who possessed the confidence of
an immense body of the electors, and who had been selected by the people who had
the deepest interest in his success, to give him advice and conduct the
administration. If he had doubts on this point—if he had reason to believe
that any factious combination had obtained office improperly and wished to take
the opinions of the country ; or if the Executive Council sought to drive him
into measures not sanctioned by the charter, or exhibited a degree of grasping
selfishness which was offensive and injurious, he could at once dissolve the
Assembly and appeal to the people : who here, as in England, would relieve him
from doubt and difficulty, and, fighting out the battle on the hustings, rebuke
the councillors if they were wrong. This would be a most important point gained
in favour of the Governor ; for now he is the slave of an irresponsible Council
which he cannot shake off ; and is bound to act by the advice of men who, not
being accountable for the advice they give and having often much to gain and
nothing to lose by giving bad advice, may get him into scrapes every month, and
lay the blame on him. The Governors would in fact have the power of freeing
themselves from thraldom to the family compacts, which none of them can now
escape by the exercise of any safe expedient known to our existing
constitutions. It will be seen, too, that by this system,
whatever sections or small parties might think or say, the
Governor could never, by any possibility, become what British Governors
have of late been everywhere, embroiled with the great body of the inhabitants
over whom he was sent to preside. The Governor's responsibility would also be
narrowed to the care of the Queen's prerogative, the conservation of treaties,
the military defence, and the execution of the imperial Acts; the local administration
being left in the hands of those who understood it and who were responsible. His
position would then be analogous to that of the Sovereign —he could do no
wrong in any matter of which the Colonial Legislature had the right to judge;
but would be accountable to the Crown, if he betrayed the imperial interests
committed to his care.
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
Executive Councillors
now are either heads of departments or members of the two branches who are
generally favourable to the policy of these and disposed to leave their
emoluments intact. One or two persons, of more independent character, and
slightly differing from the others upon a few points, are sometimes admitted;
but a vast preponderance in favour of the views of the official compact is
always, as a matter of course, maintained. The heads of departments are always
very well paid for their trouble in governing the country by the enormous
official salaries they receive ; their colleagues either are looking for office,
or have means of providing for their relatives and friends; while if it should
so happen, that such a thing as a colonial Executive Councillor can be found for
any length of time in office, who has not served himself or his friends, the
title and the consciousness of possessing for life the right to approach and
advise every Governor and give a vote upon every important act of
administration, without a possibility of being displaced or called to account
for anything said or done, is no mean reward for the small amount of labour and
time bestowed. Formerly these people, in addition to other benefits, obtained
for themselves and their friends immense tracts of Crown land. This resource is
now cut off by the substitution of sales for free grants; but looking at the
Executive Council or Cabinet, as it exists in any of the North
American Provinces at present, we find a small knot of individuals, responsible
neither to the Queen, the Secretary of State, the Governor nor the people; who
owe their seats to neither, but to their relatives and friends through whose
influence and intrigues they have been appointed; and who, while they possess
among them some of the best salaries and nearly all the patronage of the
country, have a common interest in promoting extravagance, resisting economy,
and keeping up the system exactly as it stands. It will be perceived that such a
body as this may continue to govern a colony for centuries; like the Old Man of
the Sea, who got upon Sinbad's back, ordinary exertions cannot shake it off. To
understand more clearly how un-English, how anti-constitutional, how dangerous
this body is, it is only necessary to contrast it with what it ought to
resemble, but never does. In England, the government
of the country is invariably carried on by some great political party, pledged
to certain principles of foreign or domestic policy which the people for the
time approve ; but the Cabinet in a colony is an official party who have
the power for ever to keep themselves and their friends in office and to keep
all others out, even though nineteen out of every twenty of the population are
against them. What would the people of England say, if some twenty families, being in possession of the Treasury, Horse
Guards, Admiralty, Colonial Office,
had the power to exclude Whigs, Tories and Radicals; to laugh at hostile votes in the Commons, and set the country at defiance to
defend each other against the Crown and the people ; to cover ignorance,
incapacity, corruption and bad faith? Would they bear such a state of things for
a week? And yet your Lordship seems to think that we should bear it, for an
indefinite period, with patience.
Now
for this body I propose to substitute one sustained by at least a majority of
the electors ; whose general principles are known and approved ; whom the
Governor may dismiss, whenever they exceed their powers; and who may be
discharged by the people whenever they abuse them ; who, instead of laying the
blame, when attacked, upon the Governor, or the Secretary of State, shall be
bound, as in England, to stand up and defend, against all comers, every
appointment made and every act done under their administration. One of the first
results of this change would be to infuse into every department of
administration a sense of accountability which now is nowhere found —to give a
vigorous action to every vein and artery now exhibiting torpidity and
languor—and to place around the Governor and at the head of every department
of public affairs the ablest men the colony could furnish ; men of energy and
talent instead of the brainless sumphs, to whom the task of counselling the
Governor or administering the affairs of an extensive department, is often
committed under the present system. In England, whether Whigs, Tories or
Radicals are in, the Queen is surrounded and the public departments managed, by
some of the ablest men the kingdom can produce. But suppose a mere official
faction could exclude all these great parties from power, how long would the
Government possess the advantage of superior abilities to guide it ? Would it
not at once fall far below the intellectual range it now invariably maintains ?
But it may be asked, Would not the sudden introduction of this system work
injustice to some who have taken offices in the expectation of holding them for
life ? Perhaps it might, but even if this were unavoidable, the interests of
individuals should give way to the public good. The borough-mongers had the same
objections to the Reform Act; recorders and town-clerks to that which cleansed
the corporations. This, like all minor difficulties, might easily be provided
for ; and I am sure that there are but few of those seeking to establish
responsible government who desire to overturn even a bad system in a spirit of
heartless vindictiveness.
THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
The
colonies, having no hereditary peerage, this body has been constructed to take
its place. From the difficulty of making it harmonize with the popular branch,
some politicians in Lower Canada—and it was said that the Earl of Durham at
first inclined to the opinion—thought it might be abolished. I think there is
no those of the mother country; and again, because a second legislative not
entirely dependent upon popular favour, is useful to review check undue haste or
corruption in the popular branch. Besides, I see no difficulty in maintaining
its independence, and yet removing from it the character of annual conflict
with the representative body, by which it has been everywhere distinguished.
The main object of the Executive Council being the preservation of a system by
which they enjoy honours, office and patronage, uncontrolled and uninfluenced by
the people, and they having the nomination of Legislative Councillors, of course
they have always selected a majority of those whose interests and opinions were
their own and who could help them to wrestle with and fight off the popular
branch. Hence the constant collision and the general outcry against the second
chamber. The simple remedy for all this appears to be to introduce the English tion of the Executive
Council; and then the appointments to the Legislative will be more in accordance
with public sentiment and they are now. I should have no objection to the
Legislative Councillors holding their seats for life, by which their
independence of the people would be secured, provided they were chosen fairly
whom, from time to time, the constituency, as at home, entrusted and not as they
are now selected, to serve a particular purpose and expressly to wrangle rather
than to harmonize with the popular Lords includes men selected by all the
administrations which the Britain have called into power. The House of Lords, in
the colonies, have been created by all the administrations which the people
never could influence or control. Some members of the second branch
should, of course, have seats in the Executive Council, because in that chamber
also, the acts and the policy of the Government would require to be explained;
but here, as in England, though very desirable, it would not be essential that
the administration should always be sustained by a majority in the Upper
House.
THE
COMMONS
One of the first effects of a change of system would be a decided
improvement in the character of all the Colonial Assemblies. The great center of
political power and influence would in the Provinces, as at home, be the House
of Commons. Towards that body the able, the industrious, the eloquent and the
wealthy, would press with ten times the ardour and unanimity which are now
evinced ; because then, like its great prototype in Britain, it would be an open
and fair arena, in which the choice spirits of the country would battle for a
share in its administration, a participation in its expenditure and in the
honour and influence which public employment confers. Now a bon vivant, who can
entertain an aide-de-camp; a good-looking fellow, who dances with a Governor's
lady ; or a cunning one, who can wheedle a clerk or an under-secretary in
Downing Street, may be called to take a part in governing a province for the
period of his natural life. Then, these disreputable and obscure channels of
advancement would be closed ; and the country would understand the reason, and
feel the necessity for every such appointment, and the population would be
driven to cultivate those qualities which dignify and adorn our nature, rather
than debase it. Now, any wily knave or subservient fool feels that his chance is
as good as that of the most able and upright man in the colony; and far better,
if the latter attempts to pursue an independent course ; then, such people would
be brought to their proper level, and made to win their honours fairly before
they were worn.
Another improvement would be the placing of the government of a colony, as it
always is in England, in a majority in the Commons, watched, controlled, and yet
aided by a constitutional opposition. Under the present system, the government
of a colony is the opposition of the Commons and often presents in that body the
most unseemly and ridiculous figure. Numberless instances might be given of
this. The three Executive Councillors who sit in the Assembly of Nova Scotia,
have been resisting, in miserable minorities, on a dozen divisions during the
last two sessions, votes by which the Commons recorded a want of confidence in
them and their party ; and, in fact, the Government, instead of taking the lead
in public measures with the energy and ability which should belong to a
government, cannot take a single step in the Assembly without the sanction of
its opponents. Every emergency that arises and for which an administration ought
to be secure of a majority, presents some absurd illustration of the system.
When the border difficulties with the State of Maine occurred last winter, the
Government of Nova Scotia had not the power to move a single man of the militia
force (the laws having expired) or to vote a single shilling, until the majority
came forward, as they always have done, in the most honourable manner, and,
casting aside all political differences, passed laws for embodying the militia
and granted £100,000 to carry on the war. But will your Lordship believe, will
it be credited in England, that those who voted that money, who were responsible
to their constituents for its expenditure and without whose consent (for they
formed two-thirds of the Commons) a shilling could not have been drawn, had not
a single man in the local cabinet by whom it was to be spent, and by whom in
that trying emergency the Governor would be advised. Nor are things better when
the Legislature is not in session. In consequence of the establishment of steam
navigation, a despatch was sent out this spring, after the House was prorogued,
requiring the Governor of this Province to put the main roads in thorough
repair. Of course he had no means to accomplish the object, nor could his
Executive Council guarantee that a single shilling thus expended would be
replaced or that a vote of censure would not be passed upon him if he spent one;
and to obviate the difficulty, they were seen consulting and endeavouring to
propitiate the members of the majority, whose places, upon such terms, they are
contented to occupy and to which, so far as I am concerned, if such humiliations
are to be the penalty, they are heartily welcome.
It has been objected to the mode proposed, that it would lead to the rotation of
office or extensive dismissals of subordinates, practised in the United States.
But no person abhors that system more than myself, nor has it found any favour
in the colonies, where the English practice is preferred, of removing the
heads of departments only. To those who are afraid of the turmoil and excitement
that would be produced, it is only necessary to say that if upon the large scale
on which the principle is applied at home, there is no great inconvenience felt,
how much less have we to fear where the population is not so dense, the
competition not so active, nor the prizes so gigantic. A ministry that in
England lasts two or three years is supposed to fulfil its mission ; and a
quadrennial bill is considered unnecessary, because Parliament, on the average,
seldom sits longer than three or four years. As, under a system of
responsibility, the contest for power would be fought out here as it is in
England, chiefly on the hustings; an administration would, therefore, last in
Nova Scotia until the Quadrennial Bill was passed, for six years certainly—two
years more than the Governor, unless specially continued, is expected to hold
his appointment; and if it managed judiciously, there would be nothing to
prevent it from holding the reins for twenty or thirty years. Of course, an
Executive Council in the colonies should not be expected to resign upon every
incidental and unimportant question connected with the details of government ;
but, whenever a fair and decisive vote, by which it was evident that they had
lost the confidence of the country, was registered against them, they should
either change their policy, strengthen their hands by an accession of popular
talents and principles, or abandon their seats and assume the duties and
responsibilities of opposition. If there was any doubt as to what the nature of
such votes should be, the parliamentary usage would be the guide on this as on
all minor matters.
APPOINTMENTS,
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, ETC.
One of the greatest evils of the present form of government is that nothing like
system or responsibility can be carried into any one branch of the public
service. There are, exclusive of militia and road commissions, nearly nine
hundred offices to be filled, in the Province of Nova Scotia alone ; all
essential to the administration of internal affairs, not one of them having
anything to do with imperial interests. And will it be believed in England that
the whole of this patronage is in the hands of a body whom the people can never
displace—that the vast majority in the Commons have not the slightest
influence in its distribution—while the greatest idiot who gives his silent
and subservient vote in the minority is certain of obtaining his reward ? But
the evil does not stop here. It is utterly impossible for the people either to
bring to punishment or to get rid of a single man of the whole nine hundred if
the local-government chooses to protect him.
Perhaps the most cruel injury that the system inflicts upon the colonists,
arises from the manner in which they are compelled to conduct their internal
improvements. This has been noticed by Lord Durham. But perhaps his Lordship did
not fully comprehend the reasons which render the mode—however anomalous and
injurious—in some degree acceptable to the constituency, in order that other
evils may be prevented, which might be a great deal worse. It will be perceived
that the nine hundred offices already referred to, are generally distributed by
the irresponsible official party in such a way as to buy their peace or
strengthen their influence in the country. Let us see how this operates in
practice. Suppose a county sends to the Assembly four representatives, all of
whom support the local government; the patronage of that county is of course at
their disposal to strengthen their hands and keep down all opposition ; but
should the whole be hostile to the compact, then it is used to foster opposition
and create a party to displace them. If there is a division of sentiment among
the members, those who support are always aided in mortifying and getting rid of
those who attack the Government. Though but one of the four is an adherent of
the compact, every man in the county knows that his influence is worth much more
than that of the other three; that while one can obtain any favour he wants for
a friend or partisan, the others cannot, unless by the barter of a corrupt vote
or the sacrifice of principle, even obtain justice. Now, if besides these nine
hundred offices, about five hundred commissions for the expenditure of the
surplus revenues of the country upon roads, bridges and internal improvements,
were given over to be disposed of in the same way, the hands of the compact
would be so much strengthened that it would be still more easy to create a party
in a county, to endanger the .seat of any member who ventured to give an
independent vote. To obviate this risk, which was seen at an early period to
menace the independence of the Commons, it was determined that the members from
each county should recommend the commissioners for the expenditure of moneys
within it ; and this being acquiesced in by the Governors for some time before
its political bearing was much regarded by the compacts, has grown into usage
which they have not ventured openly to attack; although, as they still contend
that the right of appointment is in the Executive, they seldom fail to show
their power
and vent their feelings, by petty alterations almost every year. The advantages
of this arrangement are that the majority of this constituency —and not the
minority, as in every other case—distribute the patronage under this branch of
expenditure; and, as the members who name commissioners have a great deal of
local knowledge, and are, moreover, responsible to the people, they can be
called to account if they abuse this trust. But still, from the very nature of
things, it is liable to abuse. Road commissions may be multiplied and sums
unwisely expended to secure votes at the next election, or to reward, not a good
road maker but a zealous partisan. The Executive has not the control it would
have if these men were selected by the Government; and the legislative power,
which should be used to unmask corruption, is sometimes abused to afford it
shelter. The remedy which our compacts always suggest, like all their remedies
for political discrepancies, aims at the extension of their own influence and
the firmer establishment of their own power. They are loud, upon all occasions,
in denouncing the corruption of the road system. The minority in the Assembly
are eloquent on the same theme ; while, through the columns of some newspaper in
their pay, they are always pouring forth complaints that the roads are
wretchedly bad and will never be better until the expenditure is placed in their
hands. It will be perceived, however, that to follow their advice, would be to
make what is admitted on all hands to have its evils a great deal worse;
because, if these nominations are taken from those who possess local
information, and given to men who have little or none, who will not be advised
by those who have, and who can be, called to account by no power known to the
constitution ;besides a great deal more of blundering being the result, the
partial responsibility, which now makes the system barely tolerable, would be
entirely removed. Political partisans would still be rewarded ; but instead of
all parties in the country sharing the patronage (for members of the minority,
as well as of the majority, make these appointments), it would be confined to
those only who supported the compact, and who, however imbecile, ignorant or
corrupt, would then be, as every other officer in the colony is now, independent
of any description of popular control. If any doubt could be entertained as to
whether the public would lose or gain by the change, evidence enough might be
gathered; for some of the vilest jobs and most flagrant cases of mismanagement
that disgrace the history of the road service in Nova Scotia, have been left as
monuments of the ignorance or folly of the compact, whenever they have taken
these matters into their own hands.
But make the Governor's advisers responsible to the Assembly and the
representatives would at once resign to them the management of such affairs. It
would then be the business of the Executive, instead of leaving the road service
to the extemporaneous zeal or corrupt management of individuals, to come
prepared, at the commencement of each session, with a general review of the
whole system ; and supported by its majority, to suggest and to carry a
comprehensive and intelligible scheme, embracing the whole of this service,
accounting for the previous year's expenditure and appointments, and accepting the
suggestions of members as to the plans of the current year. We should then have
an Executive to which every commissioner would be directly account-able; to
which he could apply for instructions from January to December; and which, being
itself responsible, would be careful of its proceedings ; and yet, being more
independent than individual members are in dealing with their own constituents,
would be more firm and unyielding where it was right. This is the simple and I
am satisfied the only safe remedy for the abuses of the road system. To take the
distribution of commissions from fifty men, possessed of much local knowledge
and partially responsible, to give it to twelve others having less information
and subject to no control, would be an act of madness. Fortunately, in this, as
in all other cases, we have no occasion to seek for new theories or try unsafe
experiments ; let us adopt the good old practices of our ancestors and of our
brethren; let us "keep the old paths," in which, while there is much
facility, there is no danger.
My Lord, there is an argument used against the introduction of Executive
responsibility, by Sir Francis Head, which it may be well to notice, because it
has been caught up by shallow thinkers everywhere, and is often urged with an
air of triumph, that to those who look beyond the surface, is somewhat
ridiculous. It is said, if this principle had been in operation, Papineau and
Mackenzie would have been ministers in the respective Provinces they disturbed 1
But do those who urge this objection ever stay to inquire whether, if there had
been responsibility in the Canadas, either of these men could have assumed so
much consequence as to be able to obstruct the operations of government and
create a rebellion in a British Province ? Nothing made a dictator tolerable in
ancient Rome but a sense of common danger, arising out of some unusual and
disastrous posture of affairs, which rendered it necessary to confide to an
individual extraordinary powers—to raise one man far above all others of his
own rank—to substitute his will for the ordinary routine of administration and
to make the words of his mouth the law of the land. When the danger passed away,
the dictator passed away with it. Power, no longer combined in one mighty
stream, the eccentric violence of which though useful might be destructive, was
distributed over the surface of society and flowed again through a thousand
small but well-established channels, everywhere stimulating and refreshing but
nowhere exciting alarm. In political warfare, this practice of the ancients has
been followed by the moderns with good success. O'Connell in Ireland, and
Papineau and Mackenzie in Canada, grew into importance from the apparent
necessity which existed for large masses of men to bestow upon individuals
unlimited confidence and invest them with extraordinary powers. I wish that the
two latter, instead of provoking the maddest rebellions on record, had possessed
the sound sense and consummate prudence which have marked every important step
of the former's extraordinary career. But who believes, if Ireland had had
" justice " instead of having it to seek, that ever such a political
phenomenon as the great agitator would have appeared to challenge our admiration
and smite the oppressors with dismay? And who dreams that but for the wretched
system upheld in all the colonies, and the entire absence of responsibility, by
which faction or intrigue were made the only roads to power, either of the
Canadian demagogues would ever have had an inducement or been placed in a
position to disturb the public peace? I grant that even under the forms which I
recommend, such men as Papineau and Mackenzie might have existed; that they
might have become conspicuous and influential; and that it is by no means
improbable that they would have been Executive Councillors of their respective
Provinces, advising the Governors and presiding over the administration of their
internal affairs. But suppose they had; would not even this have been better
than two rebellions—the scenes at Windsor, St. Charles and St. Eustache—the
frontier atrocities—and the expenditure of three millions sterling, which will
be the cost before the accounts are closed? Does any man in his senses believe,
if Mackenzie or Bidwell could have guided the internal policy and dispensed the
local patronage according to the British mode, that either of them would have
been so mad as to dream of turning Upper Canada into a republic; when, even if
they succeeded, they could only hope to be Governors for a few years with powers
very much more restricted and salaries not more ample than were theirs for life
or as long as they preserved their majority? Possessed of honours and
substantial power (not made to feel that they who could most effectually serve
the Crown were excluded by a false system from its favour that others less
richly endowed might rise upon their ruins), would these men have madly rushed
into rebellion with the chances before them of expatriation or of an ignominious
death?
You
well know, my Lord, that rebels have become exceedingly scarce at home since the
system of letting the majority govern has become firmly established, and yet
they were as plenty as blackberries in the good old times, when the sovereigns
contended, as Sir Francis Head did lately, that they only were responsible. Turn
back and you will find that they began to disappear altogether in England about
1688, and that every political change which makes the Executive more completely
responsible to the Legislature and the Legislature to the country at large,
renders the prospects of a new growth, "small by degrees and beautifully
less." And yet, my Lord, who can assure us, that if the sovereigns had
continued, as of old, alone responsible; if hundreds of able men, all running
the same course of honourable ambition, had not been encouraged to watch and
control each other ; and if the system of governing by the minority and not by
the majority and of excluding from power all who did not admire the mode and
quarrelled with the court, had existed down to the present day; who, I ask, will
assure us, that Chatham and Fox, instead of being able ministers and loyal men,
might not have been sturdy rebels? Who can say that even your Lordship,
possessed of the strong attachment to liberty which distinguishes your family,
might not,—despairing of all good government under such a system,—instead of
using your influence to extend by peaceful improvements the happiness of the
people, be at this moment in the field at their head and struggling, sword in
hand, to abate the power of the Crown ? So long as the irresponsibility
principle was maintained in Scotland and the viceroys and a few bishops and
courtiers engrossed the administration, there were such men as Hume and Lindsay,
and such things as assemblies in Glasgow, general tables in Edinburgh, and armed
men in every part of that noble country, weakening the Government and resisting
the power of the Crown ; and up to the period when Lord Normanby assumed the
government of Ireland and it became a principle of administration that the
minority were no longer to control the majority and shut them out from all the
walks of honourable ambition, what was the attitude in which Mr. O'Connell stood
towards the Sovereign ? Was it not one of continual menace and hostility, by
which the latter was degraded and the former clothed with a dangerous importance
? And what is his attitude now ? Is it not that of a warm-hearted supporter of
the Queen, whose smiles are no longer confined to a faction but shed over a
nation, every man of which feels that he is free to obtain, if he has ability
and good fortune to deserve, the highest honours in her power to bestow ? Daniel
O'Connell (and perhaps it may be said that his tail suggested the comparison) is
no longer a political comet blazing towards the zenith and filling the
terror-stricken beholders with apprehensions of danger and a sense of coming
change ; but a brilliant planet, revolving in an orbit with the extent of which
all are familiar and reflecting back to the source of light and honour the beams
which it is proud to share. Who any longer believes that O'Connell is to shake
the empire and overturn the throne ? And who doubts, had he despaired of
justice, but he too might have been a rebel and that the continued application
to Ireland of the principles I denounce, would have revived the scenes and the
sufferings through which she passed in 1798 ?
If, my Lord, in every one of the three great kingdoms from which the population
of British America derive their origin, the evils of which we complain were
experienced and continued until the principles we claim as our birthright became
firmly established, is it to be expected that we shall not endeavour to rid
ourselves, by respectful argument and remonstrance, of what cost you open and
violent resistance to put down ? Can an Englishman, an Irishman or a Scotchman,
be made to believe, by passing a month upon the sea, that the most stirring
periods of his history are but a cheat and a delusion ; that the scenes which he
has been accustomed to tread with deep emotion are but mementoes of the folly
and not, as he once fondly believed, of the wisdom and courage of his ancestors
; that the principles of civil liberty, which from childhood he has been taught
to cherish and to protect by forms of stringent responsibility, must, with the
new light breaking in upon him on this side of the Atlantic, be cast aside as an
useless incumbrance ? No, my Lord, it is madness to suppose that these men, so
remarkable for carrying their national characteristics into every part of the
world where they penetrate, shall lose the most honourable of them all, merely
by passing from one portion of the empire to another. Nor is it to be supposed
that Nova Scotians, New Brunswickers and Canadians—a race sprung from the
generous admixture of the blood of the three foremost nations of the
world—proud of their parentage and not unworthy of it, to whom every
stirring period of British and Irish history, every great principle which they
teach, every phrase of freedom to be gleaned from them, are as familiar as
household words, can be in haste to forget what they learnt upon their parents'
knees; what those they loved and honoured clung to with so much pride and
regarded as beyond all price. Those who expect them thus to belie their origin
or to disgrace it, may as soon hope to see the streams turn back upon their
fountains. My Lord, my countrymen feel, as they have a right to feel, that the
Atlantic, the great highway of communication with their brethren at home, should
be no barrier to shut out the civil privileges and political rights, which more
than anything else, make them proud of the connection; and they feel also, that
there is nothing in their present position or their past conduct to warrant such
exclusion. Whatever impression may have been made by the wholesome satire
wherewith one of my countrymen has endeavoured to excite the others to still
greater exertions, those who fancy that Nova Scotians are an inferior race to
those who dwell upon the ancient, homestead or that they will be contented with
a less degree of freedom, know little of them. A country that a century ago was
but a wilderness and is now studded with towns and villages, and intersected
with roads, even though more might have been done under a better system, affords
some evidence of industry. Nova Scotian ships, bearing the British flag into
every quarter of the globe, are some proofs of enterprise; and the success of
the native author, to whom I have alluded, in the wide field of intellectual
competition, more than contradicts the humorous exaggeration by which, while we
are stimulated to higher efforts, others may be for a moment misled. If then our
right to inherit the constitution be clear, if our capacity to maintain and
enjoy it cannot be questioned, have we done anything to justify the alienation
of our birthright? Many of the original settlers of this Province emigrated from
the old colonies when they were in a state of rebellion—not because they did
not love freedom, but because they loved it under the old banner and the old
forms ; and many of their descendants have shed their blood, on land and sea, to
defend the honour of the Crown and the integrity of the empire. On some of the
hardest fought fields of the Peninsula, my countrymen died in the front rank,
with their faces to the foe. The proudest naval trophy of the last American war
was brought by a Nova Scotian into the harbour of his native town; and the blood
that flowed from Nelson's death wound in the cockpit of the Victory mingled with
that of a Nova Scotian stripling beside him, struck down in the same glorious
fight. Am I not then justified, my Lord, in claiming for my countrymen that
constitution, which can be withheld from them by no plea but one unworthy of a
British statesman—the tyrant's plea of power? I know that I am; and I feel
also, that this is not the race that can be hoodwinked with sophistry, or made
to submit to injustice without complaint. All suspicion of disloyalty we cast
aside, as the product of ignorance or cupidity; we seek for nothing more than
British subjects are entitled to; but we will be contented with nothing less.
My Lord, it has been said, that if this system of responsibility were
established, it would lead to a constant struggle for office and influence,
which would be injurious to the habits of our population and corrupt the
integrity of public men. That it would lead to the former I admit ; but that the
latter would be a consequence I must take leave to deny, until it can be shown,
that in any of the other employments of life, fair competition has that effect.
Let the bar become the bar only of the minority, and how long would there be
honour and safety in the profession ? Let the rich prizes to be won in commerce
and finance be confined to a mere fragment, instead of being open to the whole
population, and I doubt whether the same benefits, the same integrity, or the
same satisfaction would grace the monopoly, that now spring from an open, fair
and manly competition, by which, while individuals prosper, wealth and
prosperity are gathered to the state. To be satisfied that this fair competition
can with safety and the greatest advantage be carried into public as well as
private affairs, it is only necessary to contrast the example of England with
that of any continental nation where the opposite system has been pursued. And
if in England the struggle for influence and office has curbed corruption and
produced examples of consistency and an adherence to principle extremely rare in
other countries, and in none more so than in the colonies, where the course
pursued strikes at the very root of manly independence, why should we apprehend
danger from its introduction or shrink from the peaceful rivalry it may
occasion? But, my Lord, there is another view that ought to be taken of this
question. Ought not British statesmen to ask themselves, is it wise to leave a
million and a half of people, virtually excluded from all participation in the
honourable prizes of public life 7 There is not a weaver's apprentice or a
parish orphan in England, that does not feel that he may, if he has the talent,
rise through every grade of office, municipal and national, to hold the reins of
government and influence the destinies of a mighty empire. The Queen may be
hostile, the Lords may chafe, but neither can prevent that weaver's apprentice
or that parish orphan from becoming Prime Minister of England. Then look at the
United States, in which the son of a mechanic in the smallest town, of a
squatter in the wildest forest, may contend, on equal terms, with the proudest,
for any office in twenty-eight different States ; and having won as many as
contents him, may rise, through the national grades, to be President of the
Union. There are no family compacts to exclude these aspirants ; no little knots
of irresponsible and self-elected councillors, to whom it is necessary to sell
their principles, and before whom the manliness of their nature must be
prostrated, before they can advance. But, in the colonies, where there are no
prizes so splendid as these, is it wise or just to narrow the field and confine
to little cliques of irresponsible politicians, what prizes there are ? No, my
Lord, it is neither just nor wise. Every poor boy in Nova Scotia (for we have
the feelings of pride and ambition common to our nature) knows that he has the
same right to the honours and emoluments of office as he would have if he lived
in Britain or the United States; and he feels, that while the great honours of
the empire are almost beyond his reach, he ought to have a chance of dispensing
the patronage and guiding the administration of his native country without any
sacrifice of principle or diminution of self-respect.
My Lord, I have done. If what has been written corrects any error into which
your Lordship or others may have fallen and communicates to some, either in
Britain or the colonies, information upon a subject not generally under-stood, I
shall be amply repaid. Your Lordship will perhaps pardon me for reminding you
that, in thus eschewing the anonymous and - putting my name to an argument in
favour of Executive responsibility for the North American colonies, I am acting
under a sense of deep responsibility myself. I well know that there is not a
press in the pay of any of the family compacts, that will not misrepresent my
motives and pervert my language ; that there is not an over-paid and
irresponsible official, from Fundy to the Ottawa, whose inextinguishable
hostility I shall not have earned for the remainder of my life. The example of
your Lordship will however help me to bear these burdens with patience. You have
lived and prospered, and done the state good service, and yet thousands of
corrupt boroughmongers and irresponsible corporators formerly misrepresented and
hated you. Should I live to see the principles for which I contend operating as
beneficially over British North America, as those immortal acts, which provoked
your Lordship's enemies, do in the mother country, I shall be gratified by the
reflection that the patriotic and honourable men now contending for the
principles of the British Constitution, and by whose side as an humble auxiliary
I am proud to take my stand, whatever they may have suffered in the struggle,
did not labour in vain.—I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
your Lordship's humble admirer, and most obedient servant,
JOSEPH HOWE.
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