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MY LORD,—I
beg your Lordship to believe that no desire to seek for notoriety beyond the limited sphere in which Providence has placed
me, tempts me to address these letters to you. Born in a small and distant
Province of
the empire,
and contented with the range of occupation that it affords, and with the
moderate degree of influence which the confidence of some portion of its
population confers, I should never have thought of intruding upon your Lordship,
had not the occupations of my past life, and the devotion to them of many days
of toil and nights of anxious inquiry, led me to entertain strong opinions upon
a subject which your Lordship has undertaken recently to discuss; and which,
while it deeply concerns the honour and the interests of the empire, appears to
be, by Her Majesty's present ministers, but little under-stood. Whether or not
the Anglo-American population, upholding the British flag on this side of the
Atlantic, shall possess the right to influence, through their representatives,
the Governments under which they live, in all matters touching their internal
affairs (of which their fellow-subjects living elsewhere know nothing and with
which they have no right to interfere) is a question, my Lord, that involves
their happiness and freedom. To every Nova Scotian it is no light matter that
the country of his birth, in whose bosom the bones of a hardy and loyal ancestry repose, and whose surface is
possessed by a population inferior in none of the
physical, moral, or mental attributes which distinguish
his race, to any branch of the great British family, should be free and happy. I share with my countrymen their solicitude on this
subject; I and my children will share their deep disgrace, if the doctrines
recently attributed to your Lordship are to prevail; to the utter exclusion of
us all from the blessings and advantages of responsible government, based upon
the principles of that Constitution which your Lordship's forefathers laboured
to establish and ours have taught us to revere. To the consciousness of social
and political degradation which must be my portion, if the future government of
North America is arranged upon the principles recently avowed by the ministry, I
am reluctant that the reflection should be added that the colonists were
them-selves to blame in permitting a great question, without ample discussion
and remonstrance, to be decided upon grounds which they knew to be untenable and
untrue. In addressing your Lordship on such a topic, it is gratifying to reflect
that your past life is a guarantee that the moment you are satisfied that a
greater amount of freedom and happiness can be conferred on any portion of your
fellow-subjects than they now enjoy, without endangering the welfare of the whole—when once convinced that
the great principles of the British Constitution can be more widely extended,
without peril to the integrity of the empire—you will not hesitate to lend the
influence of your great name and distinguished talents to the good old cause
"for which Hampden died in the field and Sidney on the scaffold."
Lord Durham's Report upon the
affairs of British North America appears to have produced much excitement in
England. The position which his Lord-ship occupies as a politician at home naturally
draws attention to whatever he says and does; and the disclosures made in the
Report must appear so strange to many and the remedies suggested so bold and
original to many more, that I am not surprised at the notice bestowed by friends
and foes
on this very important
document. From what I have seen, however, it is evident that his Lordship is
paying the penalty of party connection ; and that his opinions on Canadian
affairs, instead of being tried upon their merits, are in many cases applauded
or opposed, as his views of British and Irish politics happen to be relished or
condemned. It is almost too much to expect that my feeble voice will be heard
amidst the storm of praise and censure that this Report has raised ; and yet
there may be some, who, disliking this mode of estimating a state paper, or
distrusting the means of judging possessed by many who express opinions, but
whose practical experience of the working of colonial constitutions has been but
slight—if indeed they have had any—may feel disposed to ask, What is thought
of the Report in the colonies? Are its leading features recognized as true to
nature and experience there? Are the remedies suggested approved by the people
whose future destinies they are to influence and control?
The
Report has circulated for some months in the colonies, and I feel it a duty to
state the grounds of my belief that his Lordship in attributing many if not
all of our colonial evils and disputes to the absence of responsibility in
our rulers to those whom they are called to govern, is entirely warranted by
the knowledge of every intelligent colonist ; that the remedy pointed out,
while it possesses the merits of being extremely simple and eminently
British,—making them so responsible, is the only cure for those evils short
of arrant quackery ; the only secure foundation upon which the power of the
Crown can be established on this -continent, so as to defy internal
machination and foreign assault.
It
appears to me that a very absurd opinion has long prevailed among many worthy
people, on both sides of the Atlantic ; that the selection of an Executive
Council, who, upon most points of domestic policy, will differ from the great
body of the inhabitants and the majority of their representatives, is
indispensable to the very existence of colonial institutions ; and that if it
were otherwise, the colony would fly off, by the operation of some latent
principle of mischief, which I have never seen very clearly defined. By those
who entertain this view, it is assumed, that Great Britain is indebted for the
preservation of her colonies, not to the natural affection of their inhabitants—to
their pride in her history, to their participation in the benefit of her
warlike, scientific or literary achievements,—but to the disinterested
patriotism of a dozen or two of persons, whose names are scarcely known in
England, except by the clerks in Downing Street ; who are remarkable for
nothing above their neighbours in the colony, except perhaps the enjoyment of
offices too richly endowed ; or their zealous efforts to annoy, by the distribution
of patronage and the management of public affairs, the great body of the
inhabitants, whose sentiments they cannot change.
I have ever held, my Lord, and still hold to the belief, that the population
of British North America are sincerely attached to the parent State; that they
are proud of their origin, deeply interested in the integrity of the empire
and not anxious for the establishment
of any other form of government here than that which you enjoy at home; which,
while it has stood the test of ages and purified itself by successive
peaceful revolutions, has so developed the intellectual, moral and natural
resources of two small Islands, as to enable a people, once
comparatively far behind their neighbours in influence and improvement, to combine and wield the
energies of a dominion more vast in extent and complicated in all its
relations than any other in ancient or modern times. Why should we desire a
severance of old ties that are more honourable than any new ones we can form ?
Why should we covet institutions more perfect than those which have worked so
well and produced such admirable results i Until it can be shown that
there are forms of government, combining stronger executive power with more of individual liberty; offering
nobler incitements to honourable ambition, and more security to unaspiring?
ease and humble industry; why should it be taken for granted, either by our
friends in England or our enemies elsewhere, that we are panting for new
experiments; or are disposed to repudiate and cast aside the principles of
that excellent Constitution, cemented by the blood and the long experience
of our fathers and upon which the vigorous energies of our brethren, driven to
apply new principles to a field of boundless resources, have failed
to improve ? This suspicion is a libel upon the colonist and upon the
Constitution he claims as his inherit-ance;
and the principles of which he believes to be as applicable to all the
exigencies of the country where he resides, as they have proved to be to those
of the fortunate Islands in which they were first developed.
If
the conviction of this fact were once acknowledged by the intelligent and influential men of all parties
in Britain, colonial misrule would speedily end and the reign of order indeed
commence. This is not a party question. I can readily understand how
the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel may differ from your Lordship or the Earl of Durham as to whether
measures should be carried, which they believe will impair and you feel
will renovate the Constitution;
but surely none of these distinguished men would wish to deny the Constitution
itself to large bodies of British subjects on this side of the water, who
have not got it, who are anxious to secure its advantages to themselves and their children; who, while they
have no ulterior designs that can by any possibility make the
concession dangerous, can never be expected to be contented with a system the very reverse of that they admire; and in view of the proud
satisfaction with which, amidst all their manly struggles for power, their
brethren at home survey the simple machinery of a government, which we believe
to be, like the unerring principles of science, as applicable to one side of
the Atlantic as to the other, but which we are nevertheless denied.
Many persons, not familiar with the facts, may wonder how this occurs, and be
disposed to doubt the correctness of my assertion. It
seems strange that those who live within the British Empire should be governed
by other principles than those of the British Constitution; and yet it is
true, notwithstanding.
Let me illustrate the fact, by a few references to British and Colonial
affairs. In England, the government is invariably entrusted to men whose
principles and policy the mass of those who possess the elective franchise
approve and who are sustained by a majority in the House of Commons. The
Sovereign may be personally hostile to them ; a majority of the House of Lords
may oppose them in that august assembly ; and yet they govern the country
until, from a deficiency of talent, or conduct, or from ill fortune, they find
their representative majority diminished, and some rival combination of able
and influential men in condition to displace them. If satisfied that the
Commons truly reflect the opinions of the constituency, they resign ; if there
is any doubt, a dissolution is tried, and the verdict of the country decides
to which party its destinies are to be confided. You, in common with every
Englishman living at home, are so familiar with the operation of this system
and so engrossed with a participation in the ardent intellectual
competition it occasions, that perhaps you seldom pause to admire what
attracts as little attention as the air you breathe. The cabman who drives
past St. Paul's a dozen times a day, seldom gazes at its ample outline or
excellent proportions ; and yet they impress the colonist with awe and wonder
and make him regret that he has left no such edifice in the west.
As a politician, then, your Lordship's only care is, to place or retain your
party in the ascendant in the House of Commons. You never doubt for an instant
that if they are so, they must influence the policy and dispense the patronage
of the Government. This simple and admirable principle of letting the majority
govern, you carry out in all your corporations, clubs, and public companies
and associations ; and no more suspect that there is danger in it or that the
minority are injured when compelled to submit, than you see injustice in
awarding a cup at Epsom or Doncaster to the horse that has won rather than to
the animal which has lost the race. The effects of this system are perceptible
everywhere. A peer of France, under the old regime, if he lost the smiles of
the court suffered a sort of political and social annihilation. A peer of
England, if unjustly slighted by the Sovereign, retires to his estate, not to
mourn over an irreparable stroke of fortune, but to devote his hours to study,
to rally his friends, to connect himself with some great interest in the
state, whose accumulating strength may bear him into the counsels of his
Sovereign, without any sacrifice of principle or diminution of self-respect. A
commoner feels, in England, not as commoners used to feel in France, that
honours and influence are only to be attained by an entire prostration of
spirit, the foulest adulation, the most utter subserviency to boundless
prerogatives, arbitrarily exercised,—but, that they are to be won in open
arenas, by the exercise of those manly qualities which command respect ; and
by the exhibition of the ripened fruits of assiduous intellectual cultivation,
in the presence of an admiring nation, whose decision ensures success. Hence
there is a self-poised and vigorous independence in the Briton's character by
which he strangely contrasts with all his European neighbours. His descendants
in the colonies, notwithstanding the difficulties of their position, still
bear to John Bull, in this respect, a strong resemblance; but it must fade if
the system be not changed, and our children, instead of exhibiting the bold
front and manly bearing of the Briton, must be stamped with the lineaments of
low cunning and sneaking servility, which the practical operation of colonial
government has a direct tendency to engender.
From some rather close observation of what has occurred in Nova Scotia and in
the adjoining colonies, I am justified in the assertion, that the English rule
is completely reversed on this side of the Atlantic. Admitting that in Lower
Canada, in consequence of the state of society which Lord Durham has so well
depicted, such a policy may have been necessary; surely there is no reason why
the people of Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island,
and Newfoundland, should, on that account, be deprived of the application of a
principle which is the corner-stone of the British Constitution—the fruitful
source of responsibility in the Government, and of honourable characteristics in
the people. If the Frenchmen in one Province do not under-stand, or cannot be
entrusted with this valuable privilege, why should we, who are all Britons or of
British descent, be deprived of what we do understand and feel that we can never
be prosperous and happy without?
Your Lordship asks me for proofs. They shall be given.
Looking
at all the British North American Colonies, with one single excep‑tion,
so far as my memory extends, although it has sometimes happened that the local
administration has secured a majority in the Lower House, I never knew an
instance in which a hostile majority could displace an Executive Council,
whose measures it disapproved; or could, in fact, change the policy or
exercise the slightest influence upon the administrative operations of the
Government. The case which forms the exception was that of the Province of New
Brunswick; but there the struggle lasted as long as the Trojan war—through
the existence of several Houses of Assembly, and was at length concluded by
an arrangement with the authorities at home after repeated appeals and two
tedious and costly delegations to England. But the remedy applied, even in
that case, though satisfactory for the time, can have no application to future
difficulties or differences of opinion. Let us suppose that a general election
takes place in that Province next year and that the great body of the people
are dissatisfied with the mode in which the patronage of the Government
has been distributed and the general bearing of the internal policy of its
rulers. If that colony were an English incorporated town, the people would
have the remedy in their own hands; if they were entrusted with the powers
which as British subjects of right belongs to them, they would only have to
return a majority of their own way of thinking; a few men would change places;
the wishes of the majority would be carried out, and by no possibility could
any-thing occur to bring the people and their rulers into such a state of
collision as was exhibited in that fine Province for a long series of years.
But under the existing system, if a hostile majority is returned, what can
they do? Squabble and contend with an executive whom they cannot influence;
see the patronage and favour of Government lavished upon the minority who
annoy but never
outvote
them ; and, finally, at the expiration of a further period of ten years,
appeal by delegation to England ; running the hazard of a reference to a clerk
or a secretary whose knowledge of the various points at issue is extremely
limited—who has no interest in them, and who, however favourably disposed,
may be displaced by some change in the position of parties at home before the
negotiations are brought to a close.
In 1836, a general election took place in Nova Scotia; and when the Legislature
met for the despatch of business, it was found that the local government had
two-thirds of the members of the representative branch against them. A
fair-minded Englishman would naturally conclude that the local cabinet, by a
few official changes and a modification of its policy, would have at once
deferred to the views and opinions of so large a majority of the popular
branch. Did it do so' No. After a fierce struggle with the local authorities,
in which the revenue bills and the appropriations for the year were nearly
lost, the House forwarded a strong address to the foot of the throne,
appealing to the Crown for the redress of inveterate grievances, the very
existence of which our colonial rulers denied or which they refused to remove.
To give your Lordship an idea of the absurd anomalies and ridiculous
wretchedness of our system up to that time, it is only necessary to state,
that a Council of twelve persons administered the government, and at the same
time formed the upper branch of the Legislature, sitting invariably with
closed doors. Only five of these twelve gentlemen were partners in one private
bank, five of them were relations, two of them were heads of departments, and
one was the Chief-Justice, who in one capacity had to administer the law he
had assisted to make, and then in a third to advise the Governor as to its
execution. To heighten the absurdity of the whole affair, it is hardly
necessary to add, that only nine of these twelve were members of a particular
Church, which, however useful or respectable, only embraced one-fifth of the
whole population of the Province. To the passage of certain measures for the
regulation of our currency, the derangement of which was supposed to be
profitable to those who dealt in money, the bankers were said to have opposed
their influence. Any attempt at reduction of the expense of the revenue
departments, the heads of which sat at the board, was not likely to prevail ;
while the patronage of the Government was of course distributed by the nine
Churchmen, in a way not very satisfactory to the four-fifths of the people who
did not happen to belong to that communion. Such a combination as this never
could have grown up in any colony where the English principle of
responsibility had been in operation. Indeed, there was something so abhorrent
to British feeling and justice in the whole affair that Lord Glenelg at once
decided that it was "too bad"; and, while in Her Majesty's name he
thanked the Commons for the representation they had made, he directed the
Governor to dissolve the old Council and form two new ones free from the
objections which the Assembly had urged.
Had the instructions given been fairly carried out, there is little doubt that
in Nova Scotia as in New Brunswick, the people and their representatives
would
have been contented for a time, and would have felt that in extreme cases
an appeal from their local rulers to the Colonial Secretary would be
effectual. The existing machinery of government might have been supposed to be
adequate to the necessities of the country with perhaps an entire revision and
repair at the hands of the master workmen at home once in ten years, or
whenever the blunders of subordinates in the colony had completely clogged its
operations.
But
mark the result. The Governor was instructed to call into the new Councils
those who "possessed the confidence of the country." Now, you in
England are simple enough to believe, that when the Whigs have, in a house of
six hundred and fifty-eight members, a majority of eight or ten, they possess
the confidence of the country, and if their majority should happen to be
double that number, you would think it droll enough if they were entirely
excluded from political influence, and if the new creations of peers and
selections for the Cabinet should all be made from the ranks of their
opponents. This would be absurd at home, and yet it is the height of wisdom in
the colonies. At the time these commands were sent out, the party who were
pressing certain economical and other reforms in Nova Scotia were represented
by two-thirds of the members of the popular branch. The relative numbers have
occasionally varied during the past three sessions. At times, as on the recent
division upon a delegation, the reformers have numbered thirty-three to
eleven, in a House of forty-six. On some questions the minority has been
larger, but two-thirds of the whole may be fairly taken as the numerical
superiority on all political questions, of the reformers over their opponents.
It will scarcely be believed, then, in England, that in the new appointments,
by which a more popular character was to be given to the Councils, six
gentlemen were taken from the minority and but two from the ranks of the
majority. So that those who had been thanked for making representations to the
Queen and who were pressing a change of policy, were all passed over but two,
while those who had resisted and opposed every representation were honoured by
appointments and placed in situations to render any such change utterly
hopeless. The Executive Council, the local cabinet of ministry, therefore,
contained one or two persons of moderate views, not selected from the House;
one from the majority, and eight or ten others, to render his voice very like
that of the "man crying in the wilderness." He held his seat about
half a year and then resigned; feeling that while he was sworn to secrecy and
compromised by the policy he had not approved he had no influence on the
deliberations of the Cabinet or the distribution of patronage. Things were
managed just as much in accordance with the royal instructions with respect to
the Legislative Council. The pack was shuffled, the game was to remain the
same. The members of the majority, as I have said before, were all omitted in
the new creation of peers, but one; while both from the House and beyond it
some of the most determined supporters of old abuses were selected; and among
them, a young lawyer who had shown a most chivalrous desire to oppose
everything Her Majesty so
graciously approved ; and who, in the
excess of his ultra zeal, had, upon the final passage of the address to the
Crown, when almost all his friends deserted him, voted against the measure in
a minority of four.
Here, then,
your Lordship has a practical illustration of the correctness of Lord Durham's
observations, and may judge of the chance the present system offers of good
colonial government, even when the people have the Queen and the Colonial
Secretary on their side. Such policy would wither all hope in the Nova
Scotians, if they did not confide in the good sense and justice of their
brethren within the four seas. We do not believe that the Parliament, press,
and people of England, when rightly informed, will allow our local authorities
" to play such tricks before high heaven " or force us to live under
a system so absurd, so anti-British, so destructive of every manly and
honourable principle of action in political affairs. The House of Assembly, as
a last resort, after ample deliberation, determined to send two members of
that body as delegates to England to claim the rights of Englishmen for the
people of this country. Your Lordship's declaration tells me that on this point they will be
unsuccessful, but patient perseverance is a
political characteristic of the stock from which we spring.
You ask me for
the remedy. Lord Durham has stated it distinctly ; the Colonial Governors must
be commanded to govern by the aid of those who possess the confidence of the
people and are supported by a majority of the representative branch. Where is
the danger? Of what consequence is it to the people of England whether
half-a-dozen persons, in whom that majority have confidence, but of whom they
know nothing and care less, manage our local affairs ; or the same number
selected from the minority and whose policy the bulk of the population
distrust ? Suppose there was at this moment a majority in our Executive
Council who think with the Assembly, what effect would it have upon the funds?
Would the stocks fall ? Would England be weaker, less prosperous or less
respected, because the people of Nova Scotia were satisfied and happy ?
But, it is
said, a colony being part of a great empire must be governed by different
principles from the metropolitan state ; that unless it be handed over to the
minority it cannot be governed at all ; that the majority, when they have
things their own way, will be discontented and disloyal ; that the very fact
of their having nothing to complain of will make them desire to break the
political compact and disturb the peace of the empire. Let us fancy that this
reasoning were applied to Glasgow or Aberdeen or to any other town in Britain
which you allow to govern itself. And what else is a Province like Nova Scotia
than a small community, too feeble to interfere with the general commercial and
military arrangements of the Government ; but deeply interested in a number of minor matters, which only the people to be
affected by them can wisely manage; which the ministry can never find leisure
to attend to and involve in inextricable confusion when they meddle with them
? You allow a million of people to govern themselves in the very capital of
the kingdom; and yet Her Majesty lives in the
midst of them without any apprehension of danger, and feels the more secure,
the more satisfaction and tranquillity they exhibit. Of course, if the Lord
Mayor were to declare war upon France or the Board of Aldermen were to resolve
that the duties upon brandy should no longer be collected by the general
revenue officers of the kingdom, everybody would laugh, but no one would
apprehend any great danger. Should we, if Lord Durham's principles be adopted,
do anything equally outré, check us, for you have the power; but until we do,
for your own sakes—for you are as much interested as we are—for the honour
of the British name, too often tarnished by these squabbles, let us manage our
own affairs, pay our own officers, and distribute a patronage altogether
beneath your notice among those who command our esteem.
The Assembly of Nova Scotia
asked in 1837 for an elective Legislative Council or for such other reconstruction of the local
government as would ensure
responsibility. After a struggle of three years we have not got either. The
demand for an elective upper branch was made under the impression, that two
Houses chosen by the people would sufficiently check an Executive exempt from
all direct colonial accountability. From what has occurred in the Canadas;
from the natural repugnance which the House of Peers may be supposed to
entertain upon this point; and from a strong desire to preserve in all our
institutions the closest resemblance to those of our mother country, a
responsible Executive Council as recommended by Lord Durham would be
preferred. Into the practicability of his Lordship's plan of a union of all
the colonies under one government, I do not intend to enter; that is a
distinct question ; and whenever it is formally propounded to the local
Legislatures, will be gravely discussed upon its own merits ; but whether
there be union or not, the principle of responsibility to the popular branch
must be introduced into all the colonies without delay. It is the only simple and safe
remedy for an inveterate and very common disease. It is mere mockery to tell us
that the Governor himself is responsible. He must carry on the government by
and with the few officials whom he finds in possession when he arrives. He may
flutter and struggle in the net, as some well-meaning Governors have done, but
he must at last resign himself to his fate ; and like a snared bird be content
with the narrow limits assigned him by his keepers. I have known a Governor
bullied, sneered at, and almost shut out of society, while his obstinate
resistance to the system created a suspicion that he might not become its
victim; but I never knew one who, even with the best intentions and the full
concurrence and support of the representative branch, backed by the confidence
of his Sovereign, was able to contend, on anything like fair terms, with the
small knot of functionaries who form the Councils, fill the offices, and wield
the powers of the Government. The plain reason is, because, while the Governor
is amenable to his Sovereign, and the members of Assembly are controlled by
their constituents, these men are not responsible at all ; and can always
protect and sustain each other, whether assailed by the representatives of the
Sovereign
or the representatives of the people. It is indispensable, then, to the
dignity, the independence, the usefulness of the Governor himself, that he
should have the power to shake off this thraldom, as the Sovereign does if
unfairly hampered by faction ; and by an appeal to the people, adjust the
balance of power. Give us this truly British privilege, and colonial
grievances will soon become a scarce article in the English market.
The planets that encircle the sun, warmed by its heat and rejoicing in its
effulgence, are moved and sustained, each in its bright but subordinate
career, by the same laws as the sun itself. Why should this beautiful
example be lost upon us ? Why should we run counter to the whole stream of
British experience; and seek, for no object worthy of the sacrifice, to govern
on one side of the Atlantic by principles the very reverse of those found to
work so admirably on the other. The employment of steamers will soon bring
Halifax within a ten days' voyage of England. Nova Scotia will then
not be more distant from London than the north of Scotland and the west of
Ireland were a few years ago. No time should be lost, therefore, in giving us
the rights and guards to which we are entitled; for depend upon it the nearer
we approach the mother country, the more we shall admire its excellent
constitution and the more intense will be the sorrow and disgust with which we
must turn to contemplate our own.
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